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Abstract 
The British general election on 10 May 2010 delivered Britain’s first hung 
Parliament since February 1974, and in the run-up, the Conservative Party made 
much of the economic difficulties Britain faced in the second half of the 1970s in 
order to try and convince voters that anything other than a Tory vote would risk 
exposing the nation to the discipline of financial markets.  The question of how 
well equipped an exceptional kind of British government is to deal with 
exceptional economic circumstances is therefore of paramount importance.  This 
paper argues that the Conservative Party made too much of the impact of the 
1974 hung Parliament in precipitating subsequent economic crisis and suggests 
that as such, there is no reason to assume that the Conservative-Liberal coalition 
government is ill-equipped to manage British economic affairs in difficult 
circumstances. 
 
Key Words 
Coalition Government; Minority Government; Economic Policy; British General 
Election 2010 
 
Introduction 
 
Following the first televised debate of 16 April between the leaders of the 
principal parties contesting the British general election, a YouGov poll placed the 
Conservative Party on 33 percent, the Liberal Democrats on 30 percent, and the 
Labour Party on 28 percent.  The predicted 8 percent increase in the Liberal 
Democrats’ share of the vote from the poll taken immediately prior to the 
leaders’ debate1 raised the very real possibility of a hung Parliament in Britain 
for the first time since February 1974.  The outcome of the general election itself 
confirmed the accuracy of these polls, with the Conservative Party falling 19 
seats short of an overall House of Commons majority, leading to the formation of 
a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government headed by David 
Cameron.   
 
However, the Conservative Party did not sit idly by as polls predicted a lead that 
would have once produced a comfortable victory had slipped to such an extent 
that the best it could hope for would be a minority government or the principal 
role in a coalition, which would be faced with the need to reduce the fiscal deficit 
in order to re-establish the market credibility of British economic policy.  
Instead, it explicitly made the case that a hung Parliament would be bad for the 
economy and bad for Britain by being unable to secure credibility in financial 
markets, and leading to weak and indecisive government.  In doing so, it argued 
that the hung Parliament of February 1974 provided proof that everybody loses 
when there is no decisive outcome in a British general election.    
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the propositions made about the minority 
Wilson government of February-October 1974 by the Conservative Party, in 
order to assess whether its pre-election fears were well-founded and consider 
whether there are any lessons that the new coalition government can learn from 
the experience.  It specifically asks what the 1974 experience can say about the 
possibility for a minority or coalition government to reconcile the dual 
imperatives of economic stability (based on market credibility) and domestic 
political legitimacy.  In light of the deterioration of British public finances and 
uncertainty about market credibility, these questions are of considerable 
contemporary significance.  The paper argues that Conservative assertions 
fundamentally misrepresent the minority Wilson government by overstating its 
role in damaging the economy over the longer-term.  The paper will also show 
how during this Parliament the Labour government was able to begin to retreat 
to a more moderate position than that espoused in its electoral manifesto, ably 
guided by the civil service.  In doing so, it was able to efficiently balance both the 
political and economic constraints it faced without undermining international 
market credibility until well into 1976.  The lessons of the February 1974 general 
election therefore, are not those that the Conservative Party identified. 
 
Nonetheless, with Britain facing an exceptional fiscal crisis, the likes of which has 
not been seen in this country since the 1970s, and finding itself in exceptional 
political circumstances which have not been seen in Britain since 1974, there are 
lessons to be learned from the experience of Wilson’s minority government.  
These lessons revolve around clearly distinguishing the difference between 
uncertainty and indecision on the one hand and measured compromise on the 
other.  For while uncertainty and indecision may sew the seeds of distrust among 
financial markets and increase the severity of the consequences of failure to 
swiftly act on the public finances, there is no reason to assume that measured 
compromise will do so.  Rather, it is possible that measured compromise holds 
the greatest potential to balance the imperatives of economic stability and 
domestic political legitimacy.  This is because a compromise scenario holds the 
greatest potential for the British government to address its deficit problems with 
significant authority to secure market credibility, without appearing 
indiscriminate and thereby antagonising voters.  The coalition may therefore 
offer the greatest potential to produce stable and effective government during 
the current economic crisis.    
 
The Conservative Position 
 
As polls began to show the Liberal Democrats encroaching on the Conservatives’ 
lead after the televised leaders’ debates, thereby reducing its prospects of 
forming a majority government after 13 years in opposition, it began to mobilise 
its public relations apparatus in order to warn of the potential dangers of a hung 
Parliament for Britain in general and the economy more specifically.  The 
centrepiece of this was a press conference—or rather an election broadcast for 
‘the Hung Parliament Party’—held by the Shadow Chancellor, George Osborne, 
and Shadow Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt, and the associated pamphlet, A 
Hung Parliament will be bad for Britain.   
 
Much of the document was dedicated to citing the view of ‘experts and business 
leaders’ about the consequences for the economic recovery of any uncertainty 
about who would be governing Britain, and the weakness and vulnerability of 
coalition governments elsewhere in the world.  The document noted that 77 per 
cent of professionals polled by Opinion Research Business ‘thought that a hung 
Parliament could lead to a downgrading of the UK’s sovereign credit rating’, and 
that the Centre for Economic and Business Research had estimated that the cost 
of a hung Parliament for individual consumers could reach up to £5,000 per year.  
It also presented the views of a number of representatives of globally prominent 
investment banks, including Morgan Stanley, Nomura, Barclays Capital and 
Deutsche Bank, all of which presented the hung Parliament as a worst case 
scenario with a considerable downside for the prospects of sterling.  The issue of 
Britain’s sovereign credit rating and the prospects for sterling clearly showed the 
Conservatives’ prioritisation of the importance of securing credibility within 
international financial markets, however the Party also made a point of 
highlighting problems faced by coalitions elsewhere in the world.  In doing so it 
drew attention to the collapse of the Belgian government in April 2010 after just 
five months in office, the difficulties for decisive decision making posed by the 
German electoral system, and persistent political instability in Israel and Italy 
where coalition governments are the norm. 
 
Of the opinions presented in A Hung Parliament will be bad for Britain, one stood 
out in terms of its reference to the experience of the hung Parliament of February 
1974; Peter Hargreaves of Hargreaves Lansdown argued that the absence of a 
clear winner in the general election ‘could trigger a similar situation to 1974 
when the government was eventually forced to go to the International Monetary 
Fund for a loan.’  It was this experience that the Conservative Party drew on most 
clearly with its own voice.  It argued that ‘The last hung Parliament in 1974 was a 
disaster for the British economy’, citing a 15 per cent fall in the FTSE All Share 
Index between the February 1974 general election and the end of the year, rises 
in inflation and tax rates throughout 1975, and increases in interest rates to 
protect sterling which had become increasingly vulnerable.  In combination with 
the view that ‘closed door politics’ and ‘indecision and weak government’2 would 
be inevitable in the event of a hung Parliament, the exercise was clearly intended 
to make a very serious and decisive argument.  However, the argument does not 
reflect the facts about the minority Wilson government, nor accurately 
characterise the relationship between the hung Parliament and international 
financial market credibility in 1974.  
 
The February 1974 General Election 
 
The Conservative Party called the February 1974 general election in the midst of 
a 3 day week and growing industrial unrest on the issue of who governs Britain?  
The election was held on Thursday 28 February, and of the 635 constituencies in 
the United Kingdom, Labour returned 301 Members of Parliament, while the 
Conservatives returned 297 Members of Parliament, and the Liberals returned 
14 Members of Parliament.  As a result of Edward Heath’s inability to draw 
support for a coalition, Harold Wilson duly formed a minority government that 
had been elected on the basis of a promise to bring about ‘a fundamental and 
irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of the working 
people and their families.’3  In light of the Conservative Party’s recent claims, the 
apt question therefore is, to what extent was the fact that this was to be a 
minority government in a hung Parliament responsible for Britain’s subsequent 
economic difficulties? 
 
Firstly, it is necessary to consider the state of the economy that Denis Healey 
inherited as Chancellor, and he has since described as ‘on the brink of collapse.’  
The anatomy of the faltering economy included a deficit on the Balance of 
Payments current account of £979 million in 1973 that had worsened to £3,278 
million in 1974, and an annual rate of inflation of 23 per cent as measured by 
Retail Price Index figures from 1973 and 1974. In light of these indicators, it is 
fair to assume that the government’s credibility with the financial markets would 
be closely linked to their improvement.  Indeed, the economic situation was 
problematic enough at the beginning of 1974 for the Conservative Chancellor, 
Anthony Barber, to inform Heath that it would be necessary for the government 
to ‘have access to really big sums’ of money in order to maintain market 
confidence, and to broach the subject of an IMF loan with its Managing Director, 
Johannes Witteveen.  While the prospect of borrowing from the Fund had passed 
by the end of January 1974,4 these events offer strong evidence to suggest that 
the fundamental problems of British economic policy pre-dated the hung 
Parliament of February 1974.   
 
This raises the question of whether it was a failure to act decisively between 
February and October 1974 that precipitated the IMF crisis of 1976, or rather, 
whether there is anything the minority Labour government could have done to 
avoid the crisis?  To answer this question, it is not sufficient to look at the 
economy in isolation; the political context and the implications for governing 
authority that decisive action on the economy would have must also be 
considered, on the grounds that all democratic governments must strive to find a 
balance that brings with it both political legitimacy and economic stability.  
Finding this balance was the principal problem for Wilson’s minority 
government, which while in opposition in 1973 had seen over 7 million working 
days lost to industrial disputes, a figure which rose to over 14 million working 
days in 1974.5    
 
The fact that the Labour Party’s social contract was founded on a relationship 
with the TUC that was only just recovering after the divisive conflict over In Place 
of Strife, and the discontent over the Heath government’s involvement in 
industrial relations and wage determination, are of paramount importance.  This 
is because the political situation made it highly unlikely that any of the ‘decisive’ 
measures (i.e. current year expenditure cuts, tax increases and monetary 
targeting) assumed to be feasible by critics of the Wilson government in 1974 
would have done anything more than exacerbate political unrest and create 
further market instability.  Indeed, the immediate introduction of strict money 
supply targets and an incomes policy to control the rate of inflation would have 
been likely to further antagonise the labour movement.  Much the same can be 
said of cuts to front line services as part of an attempt to divert resources to the 
export sector and correct the balance of payments, which would have 
represented a wholesale repudiation of Labour’s manifesto commitments and 
likely destroy the fabric of the social contract.   
 
When political context is taken into account, it is clear that there is no 
straightforward choice when it comes to decisive action on the economy because 
of the implications for political legitimacy.  This was clearly recognised by British 
officials after the February 1974 general election, and it was striking a balance 
between economic and political necessity that formed the basis of this short 
Parliament.  This is adequately demonstrated by the March Budget, which Tony 
Benn described as ‘a Budget that will undoubtedly disappoint the Party and the 
movement, and one which as I was listening to it, I was convinced was written by 
the Treasury and not by ministers’, and on the other, Healey has argued was 
‘received with rapture by the Labour movement as representing the first step in 
that “irreversible transfer of wealth and power to the working people and their 
families”’ that the Labour Party had promised.6   
 
In the Budget preparations, the Chancellor had demonstrated his awareness of 
the economic constraint, informing his colleagues that ‘in order to avoid a 
disastrous loss of confidence, I must show in my Budget how the extra 
expenditure, and the effects on demand of all these additional commitments, are 
going to be met by increased taxation.’  This position closely reflected the Central 
Policy Review Staff’s view that there was ‘very little money in the till and 
inadequate scope for filling it up.’  This fiscal modesty was also reflected in the 
final package announced on 26 March, which included a 3 per cent increase in 
the basic and higher rates of incomes tax, increases in personal and child tax 
allowances, a £500 million commitment to additional food subsidies, the fixing of 
corporation tax at 52 per cent, £50 million of defence cuts, and the extension of 
VAT at a rate of 10 per cent to confectionary and petroleum.7 
 
In light of the economic situation and the Labour Party’s manifesto commitments 
it might be argued that such a Budget package represented the worst of all 
worlds.  But there was no immediate sterling or political crisis, and it is by no 
means certain that a Labour government elected with an overall majority of fifty 
would act decisively to cut expenditure and limit the rate of growth of incomes in 
order to appease the market in light of its mandate.  Indeed, it is likely the case 
that it would have acted to ride out the crisis by reflating demand, confident in 
the knowledge that such action would serve to bolster support among its core 
demographic. If anything, this would surely have served to accelerate the onset 
of acute economic crisis; as Jim Tomlinson notes, the mere election of a Labour 
government in 1964 was enough of itself to aggravate Britain’s current account 
position and resulted in ‘an almost continuous balance of payments crisis in the 
mid-1960s.’  With this considered, it is possible to construct a rather different 
interpretation of the fall in the FTSE All Share Index after February 1974 than 
that of the Conservative Party, which reflects not the markets’ concern about 
indecision, but rather a concern that even a minority Labour government would 
be able to implement a return to free collective bargaining as it had promised, 
and thus potentially do further damage to the profitability of firms with 
operations in the UK.  Indeed, throughout 1974 the operation of the Price Code’s 
Productivity Deduction, which allowed for only 50 percent of wage increases to 
be passed on to the consumer, while helping to reduce the RPI by approximately 
2 percent, had done so ‘primarily by depressing industry’s profits by 
approximately 8 percent, although maybe more.’8  As equity based investment 
decisions on which the value of indices like the FTSE are based factor in such 
information, there is a strong case to be made which argues that the fall would 
have been worse if Wilson’s Labour government had had a large overall majority 
and been politically more able to aggressively pursue its manifesto 
commitments.     
 
The evidence does suggest that the minority Wilson government of February – 
October 1974 was one of moderation.  However, if it were not one of moderation 
it is difficult to see how it would have been able to act decisively to correct the 
poor health of the British economy—or why it would want to given its manifesto 
commitments—without provoking a major challenge to its political legitimacy.  
Of course, it is likely that the Labour government’s aspirations would have been 
moderated by the reality of government, but it would have required a leap of 
faith from the markets to accept this in the months after a decisive election 
victory.  As such, it is more plausible to suggest that the hung Parliament of 
February 1974 was of benefit to the British economy; it showed that the Labour 
government would not be reactionary, was able to understand the magnitude of 
the problems that were faced, and could maintain popular support.  Having done 
so, it was subsequently able to begin to introduce measures (ably guided by 
officials) to reduce the rate of growth of incomes and public expenditure, while 
acting to improve the balance of payments, in a measured and strategic way.  
Indeed, while the sterling crisis of 1976 was very real, official documents show 
that many of the measures introduced by Wilson and Callaghan throughout 1975 
and 1976 that are commonly understood as crisis measures formed part of a pre-
existing (if sometimes opportunistic) economic strategy revolving around deficit 
reduction justified by depreciation of the pound sterling that dates from 
December 1974.9  In this case therefore, it is possible to make a convincing case 
arguing that hung Parliaments can be good (or less bad) for external market 
credibility and domestic political legitimacy than a decisive election victory.  This 
may also prove to be the case for the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition.   
 
The May 2010 General Election 
 
The economy that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition has inherited 
shares much in common with the economy inherited by Denis Healey.  Issues of 
fiscal rectitude and the extent of the British deficit are once again at the head of 
the agenda, with government borrowing for the fiscal year 2009/2010 estimated 
by the Office of National Statistics to have been £156 billion.  Furthermore, while 
inflation is not of the double digit proportions of the 1970s, it has represented a 
problem for British macroeconomic policy making that has forced the Governor 
of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, to write his seventh letter to the Chancellor 
over the last two years explaining a missed inflation target.  Inflation in the 
United Kingdom has now reached its highest rate, 3.7 per cent, since oil prices 
peaked at $147 per barrel in 2008.10  The challenges of reducing the deficit and 
restoring British counter-inflationary credibility are therefore consistent 
between the two eras, while the spectre of a loss of market confidence in the 
sustainability of macroeconomic policy and the consequences this could have for 
sterling has been ever present since the return to floating exchange rates in the 
early 1970s. 
 
Both of the parties in the new governing coalition outlined their plans to address 
the issue of British fiscal credibility in their election manifestos, and from these 
proposals it was clear that there was no pre-election cross-party support for a 
particular strategy to reduce the deficit.  The Conservative proposal closely 
reflects the kind of ‘decisive’ action that it had argued was necessary in A Hung 
Parliament will be bad for Britain, and promised a Budget within 50 days of 
taking office to ‘set out a credible plan for eliminating the bulk of the structural 
current budget deficit over a Parliament.’  This programme was to be made up of 
measures including £6 billion worth of efficiency savings in the Departments, a 
one year freeze in public sector pay for all but the one million lowest paid 
workers, an end to tax credits paid to families with incomes above £50,000, a cap 
on public sector pensions above £50,000, a Ministerial pay cut of 5 per cent and a 
10 per cent reduction in the number of MPs.  Over its first term in office, the 
Conservatives also promised to cut funding and regulation costs by £2 billion a 
year and bureaucratic quango costs by a further £1 billion per annum.  This was 
to be coupled with the creation of an independent Office for Budget 
Responsibility to audit the way in which the government managed the public 
finances.  The Liberal Democrat proposals on the fiscal deficit were more 
reserved in terms of the timescale for adjustment.  The Party, having identified 
£15 billion of savings in government expenditure per year, nevertheless 
advocated the position that ‘If spending is cut too soon, it would undermine the 
much-needed recovery and cost jobs.’  As such the timing of cuts was to be based 
‘on an objective assessment of economic conditions’ which had produced a 
‘working assumption […] that the economy will be in a stable enough condition 
to bear cuts from the beginning of 2011-12.’  The programme of deficit 
reductions would be overseen by a Council on Financial Stability constituted of 
members of all parties, as well as the Governor of the Bank and the Chair of the 
FSA.11 
 
If due consideration is paid to the political and market constraints faced by 
governments, both strategies appear to be high risk.  While the Conservative 
proposal to act swiftly to cut the deficit had the clear potential to antagonise 
voters who rely on front line services or are employed in the public sector, the 
Liberal proposals risked incurring the wrath of markets by appearing tentative 
on their timescale in a way that could have been perceived as a lack of 
conviction.  The new coalition’s proposals for deficit reduction tread something 
of a middle ground between the two, promising an accelerated reduction of the 
deficit over the course of the Parliament, beginning with cuts of £6 billion from 
non-front-line services, which included cuts of £670 million from education; 
£683 million from transport; £1.18 from local government; £836 million from 
Business, innovation and skills; £704 Million from the devolved administrations; 
£451 million from the Chancellor’s departments; £325 million from the Ministry 
of Justice, and’ £367 million from the Home Office.  However, the deficit 
reduction program was qualified by the statement that all cuts would be subject 
to advice from the Treasury and the Bank of England.  A cynical appraisal might 
suggest that this element of the agreement between the parties contains 
something to offend everyone; enough cuts to antagonise people who may be 
asked to vote for one of the parties in the not too distant future, and enough 
vagueness about how far the government will ultimately be willing to go to 
convince market opinion that there is no conviction to do what is necessary.  
Early responses to the coalition programme have indicated elements of both.12  
However, despite initial caution, there is no reason to assume that either the 
electorate or financial markets do not possess the required degree of realism to 
assume that this deal represents a genuine attempt to blunt the initial pain of 
adjustment felt by the electorate and a genuine commitment to make the 
adjustment.  The government’s Budget of 22 June, which coupled expenditure 
cuts and an offset increase in the rate of VAT with an increase in the personal 
income tax allowance and freezes in alcohol and tobacco duty suggest that the 
new coalition is attempting to find a measured compromise of this kind.  If the 
measures so far introduced are interpreted this way, the prospects for the 
recovery gleaned from political stability will be of great benefit, and while only 
time can tell, the experience of Harold Wilson in February 1974 suggests that 
this outcome is not beyond the realms of possibility. 
 
Indeed, the biggest threat to British economic stability under this hung 
Parliament—a threat that Wilson did not face after February 1974—may lie in 
the nature of the political compromise.  For if the Conservative Party and the 
Liberal Democrats fail to convince their Parliamentary Parties that compromises 
on fundamental ideals and have not taken place as part of a cynical power grab, 
there is clear potential for the coalition government to undermine itself from 
within.  For the new coalition, three non-economic issues with the potential to 
have this impact have already presented themselves.  The first is the ever-thorny 
issue of electoral reform, for while the coalition has committed to support a 
simple majority referendum on the introduction of the Alternative Vote system, 
this commitment has not prejudiced the way either party will campaign in that 
referendum.  This opens up the possibility that the proposal will be rejected by 
the people on the back of a Conservative ‘no’ campaign and opening Nick Clegg 
up to accusations that he has fundamentally compromised the Liberal agenda for 
a seat in government.   The second is the constitutional change requiring a 55 per 
cent vote of no confidence in the government.  While this may be popular with 
leading figures of both coalition partners, it may be perceived as a simple ploy 
for an unsuccessful and poorly supported government to cling to power, and 
thereby antagonise both opposition and back bench Members unhappy with the 
progress of government.  Finally, the Conservative Party’s reform of the 1922 
Committee may be perceived as an attempt to stifle back bench opposition to 
government policy and limit dissent toward the Party’s position on controversial 
issues.  Each of these political issues has the potential to create internal division 
and discontent in the House, and threaten to undermine the credibility of the 
governing coalition.  If this comes to pass, it may do so with attendant 
consequences for the economy arising from the resultant instability of 
government.  However, even if such a scenario arises, this is not a lesson that 
could be learned from February 1974, and in no way justifies the Conservatives a 
priori assumptions about the negative consequences of British hung Parliaments 
drawing on that experience.   The question therefore, is not whether it is possible 
to govern effectively in times of economic difficulty under a hung Parliament; 
Harold Wilson showed that it is possible.  Rather, the apt question is whether 
this generation of politicians can govern effectively in times of economic 
difficulty? In order to succeed, they will have to show that they can secure both 
economic stability and domestic political legitimacy simultaneously.  This, in 
large part, will be dependant on whether they are able to exploit the potential for 
measured compromise to balance economic and political imperatives that the 
hung Parliament has offered—as Wilson did after February 1974.  There, you 
might say, is the rub.    
 
Conclusions: Lessons from February 1974? 
 
The above analysis suggests that there may well be important lessons to be 
learned from the hung Parliament of February 1974, but they are not the ones 
that the Conservative Party presented during the May 2010 general election 
campaign.  In fact, the argument presented here suggests the superficial Tory 
presentation should be seen at best as a public relations experiment and at worst 
as cynical scaremongering in a context where economic crisis already has many 
people fearing the worst about their employment prospects, the value of their 
property, and the likelihood of cuts to front line services on which many rely. 
 The major lesson that should be drawn from the experience of February 1974 is 
that a hung Parliament does not necessary equate to uncertainty and indecision 
that will inevitably precipitate economic crisis, but could equally allow for 
measured compromise and response that reflects more appropriately both the 
political and economic constraints faced by state managers.  Economic policy, 
after all, is not made in a vacuum; it affects people in a very real way, and 
because the legitimacy of government is dependant on the support of the people, 
this cannot afford to be ignored.  As things stand, the shockwaves of the current 
financial crisis and the aftershocks of the sovereign debt crisis have been deep 
and resonant within the United Kingdom, calling into question the sustainability 
of the British macro-economic fiscal stance and its sovereign credit rating, and 
by implication casting a shadow on the framework of fiscal policy and financial 
regulation that survives the Labour Governments of Blair and Brown.  However, 
even though the political situation in the UK is far less volatile than in February 
1974, a decisive strike at the expenditure commitments of the state has the 
potential to provoke deep popular discontent that could resonate just as deeply.  
The consequences for the markets may then be substantial, because a 
government with no mandate creates further uncertainty.  
 
By viewing political and economic constraints as two sides of the same coin, it 
would seem that there is no reason to assume that a hung Parliament will 
produce a worse outcome than an overall majority; it may be more suited to 
securing support from the electorate and sufficient to hold the confidence of 
markets in a way that reflects the government’s need to secure financial 
credibility and domestic political legitimacy.   Furthermore, while it is dangerous 
to make predictions on such matters, short-term market fluctuations in the 
initial aftermath of the election should not necessarily be understood as signals 
of impending crisis.  After all, while long-term stability is in the interest of 
financial investors, it is short-term fluctuations in market values from which 
traders make their profits.   Indeed, it is likely (and not revolutionary to suggest) 
that the soundest basis for economic recovery and stable government is to 
produce a credible (most likely rules based) medium-term strategy for reducing 
the deficit that is able to dull the pain of initial adjustments felt by voters.  In 
many respects, this would seem to have been the least likely outcome had any 
party won an overall majority, and there is no reason to assume that the 
Conservative-Liberal coalition government will not be able to achieve this.  
However, in the event that it fails to do so, it is likely that the reason for this 
failure will arise because of the major difference it has from the Wilson 
government—namely as a coalition as opposed to a minority government.  For if 
the kind of political infighting which the relationship within and between two 
parties with different values has the potential to create undermines the 
government, markets may well react unfavourably.  This was not a problem for 
Wilson to nearly the same extent.  Nonetheless, regardless of this speculation, 
one thing is for certain: with the issue of electoral reform now squarely on the 
agenda, the suitability of coalition government to meet the demands of governing 
Britain’s economy within the framework of the prevailing British party system 
faces an acid test.   
                                                 
1 Voting intention 16 April 2010 http://today.yougov.co.uk/politics/voting-
intention-16-april-c-33-l-28-ld-30 11 May 2010; Voting intention 15 April 2010 
http://today.yougov.co.uk/politics/latest-voting-intention-15 11 May 2010 
2 Osborne, George (2010) A Conservative Majority Guarantees Change for the 
Better, speech of 26 April 2010, text available from 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/04/George_Osborne_A_C
onservative_majority_guarantees_change_for_the_better.aspx 11 May 2010; 
Conservative Party (2010) A Hung Parliament will be bad for Britain, 
Conservative Party; London.  Available from 
http://www.conservatives.com/news/news_stories/2010/04/a_hung_parliame
nt_puts_politics_behind_closed_doors.aspx 11 May 2010, pp.2-6.   
3 Butler, David and Gareth Butler (2000) Twentieth-Century British Political Facts 
Eighth Edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 237; Labour Party (1999) [1974] ‘Let us 
work together – Labour’s way out of the crisis’ in Dale, Iain, ed., (1999) Labour 
Party General Election Manifestos, 1900-1997, London; Routledge, 192. 
4 Healey, Denis, (2006) The Time of My Life, London; Politicos, 392; Butler and 
Butler (2000), 418 and 410; See TNA T354/282, Barber to Heath, 7 January 
1974; TNA T 354/181 Note of a meeting, 15 January 1974; and TNA T 233/2950, 
Walsh to Cassell, 30 January 1974, respectively. 
5 Butler and Butler (2000) 401. 
6 Benn, Tony, (1989) Against the Tide: Diaries, 1973-1976, London: Hutchinson, 
127; Healey (2006), 393.   
7 TNA CAB 129/175, C (74) 2, 12 March 1974; TNA CAB 130/726, Misc 9 (74) 2, 
12 March 1974; Hansard, 26 March 1974, cols 277-328. 
                                                                                                                                            
8 Tomlinson, Jim (1990) Public Policy and the Economy Since 1900, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 241; TNA CAB 134/3814, PCO (74) 5th Meeting, 12 
August 1974.   
9 See Rogers, Chris (2009a) ‘The Politics of Economic Policy Making in Britain: A 
Re-Assessment of the 1976 IMF Crisis’ Politics & Policy, 37:5, 971-994; Rogers, 
Chris (2009b) ‘From Social Contract to “Social Contrick”: the depoliticisation of 
economic policy-making under Harold Wilson, 1974-75’ British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, 11:4, 634-651; Rogers, Chris (2010) ‘The Labour 
Government, the Treasury, and the £6 Pay Policy of July 1975’ British Politics, 
forthcoming.  
10 Office for National Statistics (2010) Statistical Bulletin: Public sector finances, 
April 2010, Newport: Office for National Statistics, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/psf0510.pdf, 21 May 2010, p. 9; Financial 
Times (19 May 2010) ‘King taken to task as inflation surges to 3.7 %’, p. 2.  
11 Conservative Party (2010) Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, London; 
Conservative Party, pp. 7-8; Liberal Democrats (2010) Liberal Democrat 
Manifesto 2010, London; Liberal Democrats, 14-15. 
12 Cabinet Office (2010) The Coalition: our programme for government, London: 
Cabinet Office, pp. 15-16; Financial Times (25 May 2010) ‘Age of Austerity: 
Where the savings will be made’, p. 3; Financial Times (21 May 2010) ‘Vague 
plans defer tough decisions’ p. 2.; Financial Times (24 May 2010) ‘Unions set to 
fight plans for £6bn cuts’, p. 1. 
